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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The state appeals from the district court's order granting suppression of
evidence.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs
Deputy Dustin Pulley received a call from sheriffs dispatch that a neighbor
was reporting two gunshots inside a trailer at his trailer park. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 10,
L. 8 - p. 11, L. 12.) The same neighbor, Jaime Allpress, reported a few minutes
later that the trailer's occupant, Larry Ashworth, had left the trailer in a blue 1984
pickup with license plates 6C 24694. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 11, Ls. 13-17; p. 12, L. 23 p. 14, L. 1) Based on Allpress's information, Deputy Pulley located the pickup at
the Weippe Senior Center. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 14, Ls. 10-15) Allpress reported that
Ashworth was extremely intoxicated and had gone to attend an Alcoholics

L. 18 - p.
Anonymous meeting at the Weippe Senior Center. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 1I,
12, L. 22; p. 14, Ls. 2-9.)
Deputy Pulley and Detective Jared knocked on the door of the Weippe
Senior Center, and Bill Barteaux, the leader of an Alcohoiics Anonymous meeting
answered. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 14, L. 13 - p. 16, L. 24.) Barteaux informed the
officers that Ashworth was "four sheets to the wind, and really drunk," but
assured the officers that everything was "under control" and that the AA group
could "handle this." (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 16, L. 25 - p. 17, L. 3.) Detective Jared
instructed Barteaux to step aside. (R., p. 5.) The officers then entered the

building and instructed Ashworth to step outside with them. (R., p. 5; Tr., p. 17,
Ls. 4-1 1.)
Once outside Ashworth admitted drinking. (R., p. 5.) He also admitted
driving to the senior center. (R., p. 5.) Ashworth smelled strongly of an alcoholic
beverage, had unsure balance, bloodshot eyes, and his speech was slurred. (R.,
p. 5.) Ashworth failed field sobriety tests and was arrested for DUI. (R., pp. 5-6.)
He ultimately tested at ,2741.2361.243 percent breath alcohol content. (R., pp. 7,
10.)
The state charged Ashworth with felony DUI due to a prior DUI conviction
and for alcohol concentration in excess of .20. (R., p. 34.) Ashworth moved to
suppress all evidence arising from his detention. (R., pp. 42-50.) Afier a hearing
(-see generally Tr.), the district court granted the motion to suppress (R., pp. 55-

62). The court found that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Ashworth
had been driving under the influence, that Ashworth enjoyed an expectation of
privacy in the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting at the Weippe Senior Center, and
that there was no exigency that justified entry into the senior center. (R., pp. 5562.) The state filed a timely appeal. (R., pp. 64-67.)

Did the district court err in concluding that Ashworth had a privacy interest
that prevented the officers from contacting him during an Alcoholics Anonymous
meeting at the Weippe Senior Center?

ARGUMENT
Ashworth Had No Privacy Interest That Was lnfrinaed Bv Police Entry Into The
Weippe Senior Center To Conduct Their lnvestiaation
A.

Introduction
The only evidence even arguably relevant to whether Ashworth had a

privacy interest that was infringed when the officers entered the Weippe Senior
Center to talk to Ashworth was that there was an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting
going on there. (Tr., p. 16, L. 4 - p. 17, L. 6.) Ashworth presented no evidence
of what the Weippe Senior Center is, or who has access to it. He presented no
evidence that Alcoholics Anonymous meetings are closed to the public.
Despite this lack of evidence, the court held that Ashworth, solely by his
status as an attendee at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, enjoyed both a
subjective and an objective expectation of privacy. (R., pp. 59-60.) The court
further held that the officers lacked probable cause at the time they entered the
building to seize Ashworth, and therefore the entry was not justified by the
exigent circumstances exception. (R., pp. 60-62.) The district court erred in both
of these holdings.
B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whethe; constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 84, 90 P.3d
306, 309 (2004). However, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses,

resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in
the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 ldaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997
(1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 ldaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).
The appellate court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court
supported by substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 ldaho 215, 218, 984
P.2d 703, 706 (1999).
C.

Ashworth Had No Reasonable Expectation Of Privacy Violated By Police

Action

The Fourth Amendment protects against governmental intrusion upon an
individual's reasonable expectations of privacy. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 177 (1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967); State v.
Hanson, 142 ldaho 711, 716, 132 P.3d 468, 473 (Ct. App. 2006). Thus, when
moving to suppress evidence, the defendant has the threshold burden of
demonstrating that his legitimate privacy interests were infringed. Rawlinus v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); State v. Holland, 135 ldaho 159, 162, 15
P.3d 1167, 1170 (2000); Hanson, 142 ldaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474. The test is
whether a defendant seeking suppression had a subjective expectation of privacy
that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. State v. Morris, 131 ldaho 562,
565, 961 P.2d 653, 656 (Ct. App. 1998). "Since an illegal search violates the
rights only of those who have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or
property searched, only those with such a privacy interest may obtain
suppression of the fruits of the search." State v. Foldesi, 132 ldaho 778, 780,
963 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Ct. App. 1998). See also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,

133-34 (1978); Hanson, 142 ldaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474. To show a Fourth
Amendment privacy expectation the defendant must demonstrate both an actual,
subjective expectation of privacy and that such expectation of privacy, when
viewed objectively, was reasonable under the circumstances. Smith v. Marvland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); State v. Wilkins, 125 ldaho 215, 222, 868 P.2d 1231,
1238 (1994).
In addressing the privacy issue the district court made three distinct errors.
First, the district court treated the lack of a privacy interest as a warrant exception
and placed the burden of proof on the state. (R., p. 59.) The judge's belief that
lack of privacy was a warrant exception instead of a threshold inquiry upon which
Ashworth had the burden of proof, see Rawlinqs, 448 U.S. at 104; Holland, 135
ldaho at 162, 15 P.3d at 1170; Hanson, 142 ldaho at 717, 132 P.3d at 474,
makes his analysis erroneous as a matter of law.
Second, the court's determination that Ashworth had a subjective
expectation of privacy is clearly erroneous because Ashworth presented no
evidence whatsoever to meet his burden of proof. Although Ashworth took the
stand, he never testified that he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the
town's senior center. (Tr., p. 4, L. 20

- p. 9, L. 21.)

Nor did he present any

evidence about the nature of Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, such as whether
they are open to anyone or are some sort of exclusive club requiring
membership.

(a
generally Tr.)

All factual findings by the district court

regarding whether Ashworth had a subjective expectation of privacy and

regarding the nature of Alcoholics Anonymous meetings are without any support
in the evidence, and are therefore clearly erroneous.
Third, the district court misapplied the reasonableness standard. The
district court stated that the test was "society's understanding of the privacy
afforded by attendance at an AA meeting," and "[tlhe nature of Alcoholics
Anonymous conveys an objective understanding of a group that protects the
anonymity of its members." (R., pp. 59-60.) That Alcoholics Anonymous tries to
convey a certain amount of anonymity in their meetings does not mean that
society recognizes those meetings beyond the scope of the police intrusion in
this case. Indeed, any criminal syndicate tries to achieve anonymity; this does
not mean that meetings of conspiracies are necessarily blanketed with Fourth
Amendment protection.
Of course Alcoholics Anonymous is not a criminal syndicate. The error of
the district court is nevertheless clear:

The desire of anonymity of the

organization holding the meeting does not mean that the attending members are
vested with a privacy interest recognized as reasonable by society.
Here there is no evidence of why the meeting was a meeting that society
would believe was sufficiently private that police could not intrude for the limited
purpose of seizing a suspected drunk driver. It does not appear that modern
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes the right of sanctuary; the ability to
flee to a place (such as a church or, apparently, an Alcoholics Anonymous
meeting) where the government may never intrude.

In this case there is no evidence that anyone wanting to attend this
meeting would have been barred. There is no evidence that someone walking in
off the streets would have been prevented from doing so. There is no evidence
that Ashworth subjectively believed that the meeting was not open to the public.
In short, there was no evidence justifying the district court's finding that the
Fourth Amendment applied to the officer's conduct of walking into the town
senior center during an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting to take Ashworth into
custody.
D.

Even If There Were A Privacy Riaht, Entrv Was Justified By Exiqent
Circumstances
Dissipation of evidence of alcohol in the blood triggers the exigent

circumstance exception to the warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966) (officers did not need search warrant to draw blood to preserve
evidence of blood alcohol content). This exigent circumstances exception also
justifies entry into a home to take custody of a suspect to preserve evidence of
the presence and amount of alcohol if the officers have probable cause to believe
that the suspect has committed the crime of DUI. State v. Robinson, 144 Idaho
496, 163 P.3d 1208 (Ct. App. 2007). The facts of this case show that the police
had probable cause to believe Ashworth had been driving under the influence
and that evidence of that crime would dissipate, creating an exigency that
allowed entry into the senior center without a search warrant.
The facts as found by the district court:
On May 5, 2008, Clearwater County Deputy Dustin Pulley
responded to a report of gunshots fired inside a residence at the

Lombard Trailer Park. Deputy Pulley was advised that the
suspected shooter was intoxicated. While en route to the scene,
Deputy Pulley was contacted a second time by the Sheriff's Office
dispatcher. He was informed that the original reporting party,
identified as Jamie Allpress, had reported the suspect, Larry
Ashworth, had left the residence in a blue 1984 Chevrolet pickup,
license number 6024694, and driven to an Alcoholics Anonymous
(AA) meeting in Weippe. Sixteen minutes after the initial call,
Deputy Pulley and Detective Mitch Jared arrived at the Weippe
Senior Citizens' Center, the site of the AA meeting. They located a
blue pickup bearing license plate number 6624694 in the parking
lot.
Deputies Jared and Pulley then knocked on the door of the
Senior Center, and were met by Bill Barteaux, the AA group leader.
Mr. Barteaux informed the deputies that Mr. Ashworth was
intoxicated and that the matter was "under control." Detective
Jared informed Mr. Barteaux that he "needed to step aside and
allow [the officers] to speak with Larry" and threatened "further
action" if Mr. Barteaux failed to comply. Detective Jared entered
the building and asked Mr. Ashworth to step outside with him.
(R., pp. 55-56.) These facts show probable cause.
The standards for probable cause were set forth in State v. Kvsar, 116
Idaho 992,783 P.2d 859 (1989):
Reasonable or probable cause for an arrest exists where the officer
possesses information that would lead a person of ordinary care
and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person arrested is guilty. In evaluating a police
officer's determination of probable cause in the field, a court must
take into account "the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act." In determining whether there is probable cause
for an arrest, an officer is entitled to draw reasonable inferences
from the available information in light of the knowledge that he has
gained from his previous experience and training.
Id. at 993, 783 P.2d at 860 (citations omitted). The statements by Jaime Allpress
were that Ashworth was intoxicated and drove from his home to an Alcoholics
Anonymous meeting in a certain pickup truck. The officers were able to find the

exact truck described by Allpress at the senior center where the meeting was
being held. Bill Barteaux confirmed that the Alcoholics Anonymous meeting was
at that location and that Ashworth was present and was intoxicated. This
evidence in the possession of the officers would lead a person of ordinary care
and prudence to believe that Ashworth was guilty of DUI.
The district court found no probable cause, however, because "the officers
did not corroborate any information that would support probable cause by fheir
personal observafion prior to entering the Senior Citizens' Center." (R., p. 61
(emphasis added).) This reasoning fails as a matter of law and fact.
The analysis fails as a matter of law because an officer may have
probable cause without "personal observation."

Indeed, where "information

comes from a known citizen informant rather than an anonymous tipster, the
citizen's disclosure of her identity, which carries the risk of accountability if the
allegations turn out to be fabricated, is generally deemed adequate to show
veracity and reliability." Wilson v. ldaho Transp. Dep't, 136 ldaho 270, 274, 32
P.3d 164, 168 (Ct. App. 2001) (citations omitted); see also State v. Peterson, 133
ldaho 44, 47, 981 P.2d 1154, 1157 (Ct. App. 1999). The court was wrong as a
maiter of law in holding that personal observation of Ashworth's intoxication was
a prerequisite to probable cause.
The analysis also fails as a matter of fact because the facts found by the
judge show more than sufficient "corroboration" of Allpress's statements. The
officers were able to corroborate (by observation) the specific vehicle and the
specific location that Allpress said Ashworth had driven to.

In addition,

Barteaux's statement that Ashworth was intoxicated was corroboration of
Allpress's statement to the same effect. The word of two independent citizens
that Ashworth was under the influence of alcohol was sufficient to establish
probable cause that Ashworth was actually under the influence.
The factual findings of the district court show that the officers had probable
cause that Ashworth had driven under the influence and that evidence of alcohol
in his blood and breath could be obtained, but that it was dissipating. Because
the facts found by the court show probable cause, the district court erred as a
matter of law.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
order suppressing evidence arising from the detention of Ashworth.
DATED this 28th day of May 2009.
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